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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Javier Garcia appeals his judgment of conviction entered on a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of aiding and abetting delivery of methamphetamine. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Garcia with felony aiding and abetting delivery of 
methamphetamine, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp. 7-9, 88-97, 
117-124.) At trial, the state's witnesses included officers with the Sun Valley 
Police Department's Narcotics Enforcement Team. (Tr., pp. 132-201, 202-225.) 
The officers testified that their investigation, which led to Garcia's arrest, involved 
a confidential informant (CI). (See Tr., p. 140, Ls. 2-10; p. 206, L. 19 - p. 207, L. 
15.) The CI also testified. (Tr., pp. 226-287.) 
The Cl's role was to arrange and carry out a buy of 3.5 grams (an "eight 
ball") of methamphetamine from known dealer Ricardo Vargas. (Tr., p. 137, L. 
25 - p. 138, L. 1; p. 228, L. 24 - p. 229, L. 1; p. 230, L. 20 - p. 232, L. 25.) The 
police gave the CI a wire, which allowed police to hear the transaction. (Tr., p. 
147, Ls. 13-18; p. 231, Ls. 6-7.) 
The CI called Vargas to buy some methamphetamine, and Vargas told 
the CI to come to his house. (Tr., p. 230, L. 20 - p. 231, L. 3, Ls. 1-3; p. 234, Ls. 
3-8.) When the CI arrived, Vargas was sitting in the front lawn with Jose 
Hurtado. (Tr., p. 236, L. 19 - p. 237, L. 2.) Vargas and Hurtado asked the CI if 
he was working with the police. (Tr., p. 237, L. 25 - p. 238, L. 1.) The CI's wire 
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was in his pocket, so he lifted his shirt to show that he was not wearing a wire on 
his body. (Tr., p. 238, Ls. 1-3.) 
Convinced that the CI was not working with police, Hurtado made a phone 
call, then told the CI "it would be there in about an hour." (Tr., p. 238, Ls. 4-20.) 
A while later, Garcia drove up in a Mercedes SUV. (Tr., p. 239, Ls. 4-7, 22-24.) 
After five minutes or less, Garcia left, and Hurtado told the CI it would be "a half-
hour longer." (Tr., p. 239, Ls. 6-7; p. 240, Ls. 7-8; p. 241, Ls. 7-12.) Theywaited 
roughly an hour more, during which the CI gave Hurtado $350 which the police 
had provided for the transaction. (Tr., p. 232, Ls. 1-13; p. 244, Ls. 16-21; p. 252, 
Ls.9-12.) Then Garcia returned in his Mercedes SUV. (Tr., p. 241, Ls. 17-18; p. 
242, Ls. 23-25.) 
Garcia parked in front of the house, and Hurtado approached Garcia. 
(Tr., p. 243, Ls. 2-3; p. 254, Ls. 21-25.) Hurtado's back was turned, so the CI did 
not see Hurtado's or Garcia's hands, but saw they were close enough to touch 
each other. (Tr., p. 255, Ls. 3-10.) Three or four minutes later, Hurtado walked 
back to the CI and gave him a plastic baggie of methamphetamine while Garcia 
remained in his car. (Tr., p. 253, Ls. 21-24; p. 255, Ls. 11-24.) The CI let 
Vargas take out "a couple rocks" of methamphetamine for himself as further 
assurance that he was not working with police, because in the past, the CI would 
smoke methamphetamine with Vargas after buying it. (Tr., p. 253, Ls. 13-19.) 
Police observing the transaction on surveillance saw the white Mercedes 
arrive at Vargas' house, and recognized it as "being involved in drug activity ... 
[and] that the owner was Robert Garcia." (Tr., p. 162, Ls. 17-25.) After the 
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transaction was done, the CI left Vargas' home on foot, then was picked up by 
officers. (Tr., p. 222, Ls. 15-16; p. 257, Ls. 5-9.) 
At trial, after the state rested its case, defense counsel moved for a 
judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 based on insufficiency of evidence. (R., p. 
120; Tr., p. 348, Ls. 1-6.) The district court heard arguments from counsel then 
denied the motion, opting to see what the jury decided. (Tr., p. 348, L. 8 - p. 
372, L. 24.) During deliberations, the jury asked for the court reporter to reread 
the Cl's testimony, from direct examination only. (Tr., p. 424, Ls. 7-14.) Over 
defense counsel's objection, the court had the Cl's testimony reread as 
requested until the jury indicated it heard what it needed. (Tr., p. 424, L. 15 - p. 
426, L. 25; p. 428, L. 22 - p. 451, L. 14.) 
The jury found Garcia guilty of aiding and abetting delivery of 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 455, Ls. 1-4; R., p. 125.) Defense counsel renewed 
the motion for judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. (Tr., p. 462, L. 17-
p. 463, L. 18.) The court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Garcia 
to a unified term of four years and eight months, with two years and two months 
fixed. (R., pp. 147-50.) Garcia timely appealed. (R., pp. 152-54.) 
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ISSUES 
Garcia states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Garcia's conviction for aiding 
and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine because 
there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the 
rereading of a limited portion of the confidential informant's 
testimony? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Construing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in favor of upholding the jury's verdict, has Garcia failed to show 
his conviction should be set aside? 
2. Has Garcia failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
allowing the partial rereading of the confidential informant's testimony? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Construing The Evidence And Reasonable Inferences Therefrom In Favor Of 
Upholding The Jury'S Verdict, Garcia Has Failed To Show His Conviction Should 
Be Set Aside 
A. Introduction 
Garcia contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support 
the jury's verdict finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and 
abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-14.) Garcia 
thus argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal, 
raised at the close of the state's case and after the jury returned its verdict. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6, 14-17.) Applying the appropriate standard of review, 
Garcia has failed to show his conviction should be set aside. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
conviction entered on a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence "in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
712,215 P.3d 414,432 (2009) (citation omitted). A judgment of conviction will 
be upheld where there is substantial evidence on which a rational fact-finder 
could conclude the essential elements of the crime were met beyond a 
reasonable doubt. ~ (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is that which a 
reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely on in deciding if a disputed fact has 
been proven. ~ (citation omitted). 
In conducting its review, the appellate court will not substitute its view for 
that of the jury regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to 
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testimony, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 1.9..: Thus, 
evidence may be substantial even where it conflicts or is solely circumstantial. 
1.9..: "In fact, even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently 
with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it 
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt." 1.9..: 
The same standard applies for review of a trial court's ruling denying a 
motion for judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29. See State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 
625, 629, 97 P.3d 1014, 1018 (Ct. App. 2004). The appellate court decides 
"whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict," 
and if a reasonable mind could conclude the essential elements of the offense 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 1.9..: (citation omitted). The appellate 
court independently considers the evidence, but construes all evidence "in favor 
of upholding the verdict, ... and will not substitute its view for that of the jury as 
to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence." 1.9..: (citations omitted). 
C. The Evidence And Reasonable Inferences Therefrom Support The Jury's 
Finding That The State Proved The Essential Elements Of Garcia's 
Offense Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
At trial, the prosecution had the burden of showing that (1) on or about 
August 25, 2010, (2) in Idaho, (3) Garcia "delivered and/or aided and abetted a 
delivery of any amount of Methamphetamine to another," (4) knowing or 
believing it was methamphetamine. (R., p. 103; Tr., p. 395, Ls. 9-18.) As to the 
first two elements, police testified that their investigation in this case involved 
surveillance of a methamphetamine deal on August 25, 2010 in Hailey, Idaho, 
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using a confidential informant. (Tr., p. 139, L. 24 - p. 140, L. 4; p. 149, L. 9 - p. 
150, L. 13; p. 206, Ls. 4-8; p. 210, Ls. 11-17.) 
The CI testified that he called Ricardo Vargas to purchase some 
methamphetamine and was told to go to Vargas' home. (Tr., p. 207, Ls. 8-13; p. 
230, L. 20 - p. 231, L. 3; p. 234, Ls. 3-8.) There, the CI convinced Vargas and 
Jose Hurtado that he was not working with police, then Hurtado made a phone 
call. (Tr., p. 238, Ls. 4-19.) After the call, Hurtado told the CI the 
methamphetamine would be there in an hour, and some time later, Garcia drove 
up in a Mercedes SUV that police recognized both as being owned by Garcia, 
and being involved in drug activity. (Tr., p. 162, Ls. 21-25 (Corporal Abaid's 
testimony); p. 238, Ls. 18-20; p. 239, Ls. 4-7, 22-24.) Garcia was there for five 
minutes or less, then left, and Hurtado told the CI it would be "a half-hour 
longer." (Tr., p. 239, Ls. 6-7; p. 240, Ls. 7-8; p. 241, Ls. 10-12.) 
The CI paid Hurtado for the methamphetamine, then roughly an hour 
later, Garcia returned in his SUV. (Tr., p. 244, Ls. 16-21; p. 242, Ls. 23-25.) 
Hurtado approached Garcia - still in his SUV - close enough that they could 
touch one another, then three or four minutes later, Hurtado gave the CI a plastic 
baggie of methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 253, Ls. 21-24; p. 254, Ls. 21-25; p. 255, 
Ls. 3-24.) Subsequent testing confirmed the substance in the bag was 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 338, Ls. 9-12; p. 341, L. 22 - p. 342, L. 2; State's Ex. 
12.) 
The Cl's testimony established that he purchased methamphetamine, 
receiving it directly from Jose Hurtado. The CI's testimony also established the 
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following circumstances: Garcia came to the site of the drug deal twice - first, 
after Hurtado made a phone call, and second, just before Hurtado gave the CI 
the methamphetamine. The second time Garcia came to the drug deal site, he 
interacted with Hurtado close enough to touch. In addition, the reasonable 
inference from the evidence was that Hurtado did not have the 
methamphetamine before his interaction with Garcia, but did have it immediately 
thereafter. The circumstantial evidence supports the reasonable inference that 
Garcia provided the methamphetamine to Hurtado, thus aiding and abetting the 
delivery of the methamphetamine to the CI. The circumstantial evidence thus 
supports the remaining two elements of the crime. 
The courts on appeal will not "displace the jury's right to draw justifiable 
inferences from the evidence," even though the same evidence could be 
interpreted as being consistent with defendant's innocence. State v. Slawson, 
124 Idaho 753,757,864 P.2d 199,203 (Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, the Court 
here must not disturb the reasonable inference drawn by the jury in this case that 
Garcia was involved in, and did aid and abet, the delivery of methamphetamine 
to the CI. Under Idaho case law, Garcia has not shown a valid basis to set aside 
the trial court's judgment entered on the jury's verdict, or the trial court's denial of 
his motion to acquit. Thus, Garcia's request to vacate his conviction must be 
denied. 
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II. 
Garcia Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Allowing 
The Partial Rereading Of The CI's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
During its deliberations, the jury requested to have the court reporter 
reread the CI's testimony from direct examination. (Tr., p. 424, Ls. 7-14.) Over 
defense counsel's objection, the trial court allowed the partial rereading of the 
CI's testimony as requested by the jury. (Tr., p. 424, L. 15 - p. 426, L. 25.) 
Garcia asserts this was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 18-27.) However, Garcia has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating an 
abuse of discretion. 
8. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,51, 205'P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). Where 
a defendant challenges the trial court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court 
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389,396-97,3 P.3d 67, 74-75 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). 
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C. In Allowing The Partial Rereading Of Martinez's Testimony The District 
Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion To Ensure Neither Party Was 
Prejudiced 
Idaho courts have long held it appropriate for a trial court to allow a jury to 
rehear testimony during deliberations. State v. Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739,260 P. 164 
(1927); State v. Jester, 46 Idaho 561, 270 P. 417 (1928). Current Idaho law 
provides: 
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any 
disagreement between them as to the testimony, ... they must 
require the officer to conduct them into court ... [upon which] the 
information required must be given in the presence of, or after 
notice to, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his 
counsel. 
I.C. § 19-2204. Under that provision, if a jury makes a reasonable request for 
the re-reading of testimony, the trial court must attempt to meet such request. 
State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 205, 208, 646 P.2d 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1982). In 
doing so, "[t]he trial court should exercise its discretion to ensure that a party to 
the litigation is not prejudiced." lsi 
Garcia argues the trial court failed to recognize it had discretion in 
deciding what testimony would be reread to the jury. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-
24.) In support, Garcia points to the trial court's comments that it was up to the 
jury to tell the court what they wanted to hear. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-22; Tr., 
p. 425, L. 15 - p. 426, L. 4.) However, these comments reflect the court's 
concern that the jury's deliberations should be guided by the jury, not the court or 
parties. 
In its deliberations, a jury engages in countless discussions about 
evidence or testimony that may favor one side or the other. The trial judge and 
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counsel are not privy to such discussions, and are not free to influence them by 
highlighting certain evidence over other evidence. In jury instructions, the judge 
told the jury, "the law does not require you to believe all the evidence." (R., p. 
82.) The court further instructed: 
As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate 
testimony. In your everyday affairs you determine for 
yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations 
that you use in your everyday dealings in making these decisions 
are the considerations which you should apply in your 
deliberations. 
(R., p. 82.) 
By allowing a rereading of testimony only as requested, the judge avoided 
directing the jury's attention to any particular evidence. The court simply 
ensured that the jury's request, for purposes of its deliberations, was fulfilled as 
required under I.C. § 19-2204. The court's comments and ruling demonstrate 
efforts to ensure that neither party was prejudiced, while complying with the 
statute. 
The court's ruling was also consistent with Idaho case law, which has 
upheld the partial rereading of witness testimony, when requested by the jury. 
State v. Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739, 260 P. 164, 166 (1927). Garcia points to no 
authority providing otherwise. Thus, the trial court's decision allowing the partial 
rereading of the CI's testimony per the jury's request was within its discretion and 
consistent with applicable legal standards. The court arrived at its decision 
through an exercise of reason which included recognition that the jury should 
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steer its own deliberations, and also consideration of I.C. § 19-2204 and the 
arguments and comments of counsel. (Tr., p. 424, L. 15 - p. 427, L. 4.) 
Accordingly, Garcia has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion 
regarding the rereading of the Cl's testimony. 
Finally, even if this Court found the trial court erred by not causing the Cl's 
testimony to be reread in its entirety, such error was harmless. "An error is 
harmless if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not contribute to the verdict." State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 
_,270 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
219-220, 245 P.3d 961, 971-972 (2010)). The jury here specifically requested a 
limited rereading of the CI's testimony of what it needed for its deliberation. (Tr., 
p. 424, Ls. 7-14.) It follows that the jury believed a rereading of the unrequested 
portions was not necessary for its deliberation. As such, this Court can declare 
beyond a reasonable doubt that those unrequested portions of the Cl's 
testimony, if read, would not have contributed to the verdict. 
D. Garcia Failed To Preserve An Objection To The Rereading Of Testimony 
Containing Inadmissible Hearsay 
Garcia asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court erred in 
allowing the rereading of hearsay statements to which defense counsel objected 
during the CI's initial testimony. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-27.) Where an 
appellant raises an issue not preserved through timely objection, he must 
demonstrate: (1) a violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error 
is clear and obvious without the need to further develop the evidence regarding 
the error or whether the lack of objection was a tactical decision; and (3) that the 
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error affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Garcia cannot meet his burden in this case. 
Indeed, the portion of Martinez's testimony that was reread to the jury 
included defense counsel's objection to hearsay. (Tr., p. 442, Ls. 24-25; see 
also p. 447, Ls. 9-10 (objection: not based on personal knowledge).) However, 
the rereading also included the trial court's ruling sustaining the objection, as well 
as the court's admonishment to the jury to disregard the objected-to statements. 
(Tr., p. 443, Ls. 1-5; see also p. 447, Ls. 11-15.) Given that the rereading 
included the objection, the ruling sustaining the objection, and the admonishment 
to disregard the objectionable statements, Garcia cannot show that any of the 
three elements required under Perry were satisfied. This court should therefore 
decline to consider this unpreserved issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm Garcia's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 11th day of October, 2013. 
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